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Avital Ronell 
The following pages are excerpted from an essay devoted t o  Rodney King and testimonial video.' My 
starting point involves the irreversible incursion into the domain of American politics made by media 
technology. Thanks t o  the media, the subject is being arrested according t o  altogether new protocols of 
containment. Practically everybody in homeless America is under house arrest. Few episodes have 
exploded into the polity more decisively or borne more singularly upon our understanding of the rela- 
tionship between law and the media than has the Rodney King "event." One of the questions that 
should henceforth inform our discussion of rights is thus the place of the media in the representation of 
legality. In view of televised legal proceedings and other allegories of justice, the question of human 
rights has t o  be set in proximity t o  the question of technological transmission systems. The televised 
Rodney King proceedings (Cops on Trial) treated the regulation of force, its constitution andperfor- 
mance, in terms of an ethics of dosage. While TV was under the covers, nomadic video captured the 
images of violence committed by the Los Angeles Police Department. ( A  further question concerns the 
mythic dimension of the LAPD, object offdscination for television and Hollywood: consider in this 
regard the redescription of the LAPD in Arnold Schwarzeneggerk futuristic Last Action Hero. The 
LAPD has been an e f f t  of media technological desire since at least Dragnet and Perry Mason, which 
means that it can never be a matter of mere historical reference when it comes t o  analysing the excesses 
of this police force.) Anyone who watched the trials knows that the referenti stability of the images 
was blown out of the water. Witnesses were reading blurs and blurring images. The semantic status of 
the image was severely undermined as TV conducted its interrogation of force. This interrogation has 
been a subject ofphilosophical debate since at least Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche on force. Testimonial 
video prompted television's consideration of its own textual performance in the production of force. One 
more thing: Ifeel as i f 1  ought to apologize for the necessarily elliptical nature of the following f i g -  
ment. Read it as though you were watching TV, letting yourself be interrupted by the commercials, 
phone, food, company. The seriated mode of reading will let sense accumulate around these phrases. 
So, as I was saying, the Gulf War was blanked out, put into a position of latency. As 
with all unsuccessful attempts at repression, the symptoms were bound to come rocketing 
from a displaced area of the vast televisual corpus. The Rodney King event of 3 March 
1991 staged the survival of the Gulf War in its displaced form. (Indeed, on his last day in 
office, on television, Chief of Police Daryl Gates blamed the media for precisely this type 
of displacement: "You made {the Rodney King beating] into something bigger than the 
Gulf War."' This holds for the beating, but when the troops were sent into LA, the media 
reverted to their failure to show, recovering in essence their rerunning away, or the struc- 
tural relation to the whited-out war.) 
The event we call "Rodney King" has brought the question of force, or officially, the 
question of excessive use of force, to a hearing; it has placed police action on trial. Desert 
Storm was time and again understood as police action. Whether or not this represents 
a conceptually correct assessment in terms of strategy, buildup, tactical manoeuvres, dec- 
larations of intent, and so on, the fact remains that in this case police action and military 
intervention have been collapsed in the national unconscious. "Rodney King" (who as 
such never presented himself in the trial that refers us to him) names the hearings that 
never took place for war crimes committed in the Gulf War. Condensed and displaced to 
the beating of Rodney King, the televised trial, subtitled Cops on Trial, thematized 
unthematizable force fields of intensity, while studying the problem of impact and the 
incitement to brutality with which TV has always been, in one form or another, associated. 
What is the relation between TV and violence: hasn't this been television's only question 
when you get down to it? "That's not the way force is studied," retorted use-of-force 
expert Robert Michaels several weeks into the trial. 
COMMERCIAL BREAK 
Bringing to the fore a study of force impact involving the difference between incapacitat- 
ing strikes and pain compliance impact devices (in particular the electric TASER gun), 
upper body control holds, and theories of escalation and de-escalation of force, the Rod- 
ney King trial showed how television, under pressure from video, was hearing out argu- 
ments organized around its own essence. This essence was shown to be critically linked to 
questions concerning trauma control and the administration of force. As the use-of-force 
expert tells it, on the first level the "empirical" force spectrum entails evaluations of ver- 
bal communication and effects of presence, while the second level involves responsiveness 
to pain compliance impact devices, including the upper body control hold and the choke- 
hold (whose routinely racist applications the police recognized and hence avoided using 
when beating Mr. King). Resolutely uninterrogated, the force spectrum fails, however, 
to provide a reliable grid for evaluating force because it has not been tapped by theoreti- 
cally sound means that would throw some light on what constitutes "effects of presence," 
"responsiveness," "communication," and so forth. I am not so foolish as to prescribe a 
mandatory reading list of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Deleuze, Foucault, and Derrida for 
police training, though it would not hurt (their victims). But were the police to start 
reading or knowing what they are doing, or whom they represent and why, they would 
no longer be the police, the phantom-index to which Benjamin's "Critique of Violence" 
points us. At the very least they, as readers, would be essentially detectives: those who, 
resisting group formation, sometimes have to turn in their badges or cross an ethical-legal 
line in order to investigate, piece together, read, and scour unconscious densities of mean- 
ing. It's not a pretty job, and it's generally managed according to a different time clock 
than the one regularly punched by the police. To the extent that pedagogy was blamed 
for the failure of the police to understand the scene of arrest or to control their use of 
brute force and teachers were asked to speak about teaching, questions of how to read or, 
at least, how to produce effects of learning were emphasized in the trial. While the intro- 
duction of the "force spectrum" was never in itself reflected upon or theorized about, it 
nonetheless serves to circumscribe whatever levels of responsiveness law enforcement and 
television attempt to elicit and regulate, each in the idiom peculiar to it. Working over 
the arrested body, each inscribes and wastes it, making it do time, sometimes along the 
lines of teaching a lesson. 
One would have to bring to bear a critique of violence in the manner of Benjamin, if 
TV itself were not trying to tell us something about the status of legal and social fictions. 
TV does not know what it knows. In the idiom of Heideggerian insight, TV cannot think 
the essence of TV, which it is nonetheless constantly marking and remarking. Television's 
principal compulsion and major attraction comes to us as the relation to law. As that 
which is thematized compulsively, the relation to law is at once there and not there, can- 
celling its program by producing it. (Hence the proliferation of police shows, from Drag- 
net to Perry Mason, 91 1 ,  Hard Copy, Top Cops, FBI ,  Law and Order, and courtroom dramas; 
even westerns with their lone law enforcer and inevitable sheriff belong to this topos.) 
This relation to law which television compulsively repeats as its theme is simultaneously 
presented as the unthematizable par excellence - that is to say, this is a relation that can- 
not be presented as such but can only be appealed to or offered up as metonymic citation. 
Television is summoned before the law, but every attempt to produce the relation to law 
on a merely thematic level produces instead a narrative which is itself metonymic; the 
narrative is metonymic not because it is narrative, but because it depends on metonymic 
substitution from the start.3 In other words, television cannot say the continuity of its 
relation to itself or its premier "object" which can be understood as force. This is why 
Rodney King's show, Cops on Trial, is about television watching the law watching video, 
its call to order, a figure of order that tries to find the language by which to measure out 
an ethical dosage of force. At no point do television or the police delude themselves 
into assuming they can do without force, but they do not question this essential supple- 
ment. (Concerning supplements and dosage, television, as a drug, is also a tranquilizing 
force, regularly absorbing and administering hits of violence. After a hard day's work on 
Psycho, Alfred Hitchcock used to doze off in front of TV, claiming that TV, unlike film, 
was soporiferous.) Alternately stimulating and tranquilizing, ever anxiety-producing, tele- 
vision belongs to the domain of the internalized Ge-Stell or "posure" of drugs, which is 
why, once again, the Rodney King narrative had to begin with a false start acknowledged 
by all: everyone involved in the chase had to begin with the assumption that they were 
pursuing a PCP suspect. Without this technology's relation to the asserted effects of drugs 
- hallucination and supernatural force - there would be no act of television reading itself, 
which is to say a "self" pumped up on the supposition of drugs but without any subs- 
tance behind it.4 
H E A D L I N E  N E W S .  The disruption to experience and comprehension that trauma involves 
What, then, are the charges made in the Rodney King trial? The defence has tried to 
show that, following the car chase, Mr. King took a step which in fact was a charge - he is 
said to have been charging the LAPD. The counter-charges, made by the defence in this 
case, pivot on the difference between a subject who is taking a step and one who is charg- 
ing: if King was charging, then the force used to subdue him was justified. The distinc- 
tion between taking a step and charging cannot be determined with certainty by the 
footage provided in the George Holliday videotape. There seems to be an impasse, even 
though a phenomenal imaging of this scene exists. Repeated several hundred times in 
court, the frame-by-frame analyses explicitly raise questions about the relation between 
video recording and human memory. When witness David Love relies on his own memory 
of the beating, he feels the violence to have been entirely justified; however, when he is 
asked to interpret the video, he finds the "same" scene to display an excessive and alto- 
gether inexplicable use of force. Throughout the testimony, the witness is asked to express 
"what the video does and does not say." The entire problematic of witnessing comes into 
play. An assertive if provisional conclusion nominates the video as "the best witness," but 
video, it is further argued, "doesn't tell the whole story" because it cannot reveal "state of 
mind." There are no strong readers around, at least none are called in. Superior Court 
Judge Stanley Weisberg rules out the expert testimony even of psychologists (who should 
not perhaps be confused with strong readers). 
Is there a whole story, a totality of a story, that eludes the video scope but can be located 
elsewhere? Is there a state of mind, a clarity of intention, an interpretation with its total- 
izing impulses, upon which the LAPD can confidently count?> We know that a "strong 
reading" (one should measure how much force strong reading requires) of the tapes would 
need first to account for these metaphysical ploys and rhetorical deceits if only to discern 
the axiomatics upon which the constitution of force could be thought. What  the video 
cannot in any case show, states the court, concerns an interiority which it cannot inscribe; 
the video is pure surface without depth, running a mystifying release precisely because 
it fails to record inner perceptions. Unfueled by metaphysics, video is running on empty. 
Without access to interiority, the videotape deflects the scene from its locus in truth. 
This is why the court rules in favour of human memory of violence, the flaws and gaps in 
recall notwithstanding. Precisely where human memory of experience fails to achieve cog- 
nition - so the logic seems to go  - it captures the "whole story." The court depends upon 
this evacuated site in order to retrieve a sense of the totality of the scene. This explains 
how the videotape's excess weighs in as deficiency in court. A mere machine, simply 
present while at the same time devoid of presence, it originates in a place without truth. 
As pure surface the videotape effaces interiority as a condition of running. This is why the 
police give it chase, on and off the streets, in your face and behind your back. 
But let us keep in line with the first step of this process. Did Rodney King charge or 
step? The video that records this moment does not tell. The phenomenal instability of 
the image is staggering: there is no assured way to read the syntax of the move on a literal 
level. This step, which is out of line with all the certitudes we think we have about docu- 
menting the real, is in sync with Lacan's assertion that our encounter with the real is a 
missed appointment. In terms of the reading protocols that make up our legacy, the step 
that hesitates referentially between a step and a charge, tripping up the case as it does, is 
also a Freudian slip, a lapsus and collapse in the grammar of conscious imaging. So the tele- 
vision watches as the video is on compulsive replay, tripping over this unreadable scene 
that it has witnessed. "Gehen wir darum einen Schritt weiter," writes Freud in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle: "Let us therefore take another step." Freud, like the video on compulsive 
instant replay, reruns this step throughout the text that goes beyond the pleasure principle. 
It is as if Freud is watching us watching this scene that keeps on returning. We learn 
when we vector our thought toward "current events" that we in fact are looking at recur- 
rent events whose eventuation cannot be easily located. Trauma reduces us to scanning 
external stimuli whose signals beam out a density of materials for historical reconstitu- 
tion. "We describe as 'traumatic' any external stimuli which are powerful enough to 
break through the protective shield [layering]. . . . The occurrence of a trauma externally 
induced is bound to create a major disturbance in the functioning of the organism's energy 
and to set in motion every possible defensive m e a s ~ r e . " ~  What I would like to suggest is 
that the Rodney King trial in its particularity constitutes a moment when television reads 
itself, and, staging itself reading itself, it is prompted by the interpretation of force set out 
in Beyond the Pleaszre Principle, where the death drive kicks in by taking repetitive steps 
toward a beyond. It was Jacques Derrida who first noted, in Carte Postule, how Freud keeps 
on trying rhetorically to take another step in an attempt to get beyond a textual impasse, 
but going nowhere on a fast and invisible track, keeps stepping up the momentum of 
external force, eventually achieving what Freud sees as the phenomenon of breaking into 
the psychic layer that protects against excessive force. The dramatic incursion of excessive 
force peels down this protective layering, radically exposing the subject to the domain of 
the traumatic. In the realm of media technology, such a structure of protective layering 
has been historically provided by television which, up to a point, manages the scenogra- 
phy of external stimuli. The excess of the Rodney King intrusion upon broadcast televi- 
sion dramatized the rupturing of the protective layering with which television habitually 
covers itself by showing and producing the traumatic scene of "excessive force." Broken in 
upon by testimonial video, television ceased to protect against that very thing which it is 
intended to regulate. Formally on par with television, what Freud calls the domain of the 
traumatic is not a domain according to classical calculations of space and time but that 
which opens up a site of tremendous disturbances ("wird gewiss eine grossartige Storung . 
. . in Bewegung setzen") whose limits are difficult to discern. Like television, the "domain" 
of the traumatic, while producing historical effects of reference, cannot be located in the 
world, but points instead to paradoxes of temporal complexities. We are on location, 
dislocated to the site of a provocation from the past that stammers over the "pas au del&" 
- that Blanchotian space where the step can and cannot go beyond, restricted by a pro- 
hibitory injunction that points us backward as we attempt to trace the future of a step. 
The step beyond also involves the tripping that made it possible for the taped brutaliza- 
tion of Mr. King to blow out of teleproportion and into the streets. 
H E A D L I N E  N E W S .  "The historical power of trauma is not just that the experience is 
repeated after its forgetting, but that it is only in and through its inherent forgetting that it 
is first experienced at all."7 
What urges us on, and motivates linkage between Freud's text and Rodney King's text 
and with that which underpins the war on drugs, and all the steps we have been impelled 
to take beyond the pleasure principle, involves the fact of fundamental disruption in 
traditional modes of consciousness and understanding, a disruption that occurs traumati- 
cally in the very experience of our history. This invasion of consciousness, a type of break 
in the possibilities traditionally allowed for experiencing experience, is what Benjamin 
called the "shock" - a jolt which occurs when an event is dissociated from the unders- 
tanding that might attach itself to it; shock produces a split of memory from conscious- 
ness, often triggering technologically morphed mechanisms on the order of flashbacks or 
hallucinations. 
The trial produced a number of maps, photographs, flowcharts of chronological time 
sequences; yet these common devices for capturing empirical parameters of events have 
failed to prove much of anything. Except, possibly, that we are dealing here with a type 
of experience that eludes temporal and spatial determinations altogether - something that 
can bust into a scene at any time, any place, miming the experience of the police. If the 
Rodney King beating figures the survival of the effaced Gulf War, then its principal 
"object" of projection would involve the phantom-text of a trauma. Precisely because the 
trauma is hidden from televised view - the Rodney King beating is a metonymy of a hid- 
den atrocity, be this the unshown war or the atrocities to which African Americans are 
routinely subjected - it is accessible only by reading. The spectral trauma remains hidden 
even to the hidden camera that blindly captures it. Yet, capturing the hidden trauma - 
and not the suspect called Rodney King or even the police out of line - is the way that 
video has participated in focusing the disruption to experience and comprehension that 
Trauma TV involves. Under nocturnal cover, nomadic, guerilla video captures no more 
than the debilitating discrepancy, always screened by television, between experience and 
meaning that Freud associates with trauma. This is why it could prove nothing but this 
discrepancy in a court of law. "Gehen wit darum einen Schritt weiter." 
When the trial tries to number the blows, count the strikes, and determine the veloc- 
ity of force, all it can do is attempt to parry the shock that "in modernity dissociates once 
and for all the traditional cohesion of experience and cognition."' The repeat performance 
of a frame-by-frame blow shows how this text becomes nothing more than the compulsive 
unfolding of a blank citation. In this instance, video intervenes as a distance that separates 
the witness's knowledge of the traumatic occurrence from the sheer repetitiveness which 
marks the experience of its telling. 
Is it accidental if one refers to the function of witness repeatedly by using the mascu- 
line pronoun? Or is it perhaps an "accident" of such magnitude that its enigmatic charac- 
ter has been somewhat effaced? Testimony, as Freud knew, reverts to the privilege of 
testicles, engendering truth within the seminal flow of testimonial utterance. Let's take 
this a few steps further. Standing as witness, in step with Freudian logic, and bearing tes- 
timony (zezlgen), swearing in the truth of one's testimony upon one's testicles, implies that 
the subject before the law comes under the threat of castration. The truth is related to 
this threat. Oedipus the video, lagging behind, limping out of step and out of line, pluck- 
ing his eyes out when he sees the truth: this is the truth of video, the site of the neutral 
gleam that knows something which cannot be shown. When Freud traces testimony back 
to testicles, he is also severing truth from any security net that might underlie cognition. 
Testimony, and that which it begets, is linked not so much to perception but to specula- 
tion. When Roman jurists swore upon their testicles, they were swearing upon a truth 
that could never be known for sure, to whose resolution no amount of evidence could do 
more than swear. Swearing, bearing witness, producing the testimonial - these constitute 
acts of language that, unfounded (that is, neither founded as in poetic speech nor grounded 
as in philosophical speech nor even secured by "ordinary language" usage), rely upon the 
vagaries of speculation, displacing the testimony to the fragility of the eyes: the two eyes of 
television and video, which are committed to the uncertain rigours of reading. Whether 
you are making sense or semen, you can never know for sure whether you are indeed the 
father of truth. Thus, in its essence and logic, testimonial is fragile, uncertain, performa- 
tive, speculative. (In this regard, the one who is feminized, on the side of sense certainty, 
penetrated by force, the figure of excluded negativity, is bound to lose out to the symbolic 
inscription of the testimonial.) The legal mode of the trial "dramatizes.. . a  contained and 
culturally channelled, institutionalized crisis of truth. The trial both derives from and 
proceeds by, a crisis of evidence, which the verdict must res~lve ."~  As a sentence, the ver- 
dict is a force of law performatively enacted as a defensive gesture for not knowing. 
F A C E  THE N A T I O N  
To this end, the Clarence Thomas hearings say more about that which cannot be pre- 
sented, the relation between phallus and castration, the unrelenting crisis of evidence, and 
the nature of the testimonial as the drama by which the symbolic character of testicles 
comes to be marked. These hearings bore witness to the powerful but empty phallus that 
could not be summoned to appear but around which the hearing was organized. This was 
not a negligible testimonial but one addressing itself to the essence of a supreme organ of 
state, namely, the Supreme Court of the United States. In this case, which tested the case 
of the case - the essence of testimony and the rectitude of justice - race, I daresay, initially 
disguised the sexual difference upon which legal testimony is erected and judgement 
based. It will not do to simplify the case by stating that Justice Thomas was a black man; 
identified as such, the African American nominee carried with him phantasms of the jouis- 
sance of the other and effects of the phallus. In this regard, race aggravated the demand for 
presenting the phallus; but, like the phantom it is when presentation is at hand, the phal- 
lus was made to show up neither in camera nor on camera. 
My contention is (and others have argued this according to different impulses and 
grammars) that television has always been related to the law, which it locates at the site of 
crucial trauma. When it is not performing metonymies of law, it is still producing some 
cognition around its traumatic diffusions: thus, even the laugh track, programming the 
traumatic experience of laughter, can be understood to function as a shock absorber. I t  
signals the obsessive distraction that links laughter to a concept of history within which 
Baudelaire located the loss of balance and, indeed, mankind's universal fallen condition.1° 
With loss of balance and the condition of falling, we are back to that unreadable blur 
that is said to project the step - or the charge - taken by Rodney King on 3 March 1991. 
"Trauma stops the chronological clock," writes Langer.ll This stop-watch configures 
in fact what makes television, despite the insistence of its 60 Minutes-like ticking or the 
breathless schedule that it runs, freeze. Still, television stops the chronological clock 
which it also parallels in a fugitive, clandestine way and according to two modes of tem- 
poral assignment. Television stops time by interrupting its simulated chronology in the 
event of an "event" which is neither of time nor in time but something that depends upon 
repetition for its occurrence. The "event" usually enters television from a place of exterior- 
ity in which the witness is figured by an untrained video operator (consider here the footage 
of the collapsed Bay Bridge in the San Francisco earthquake). Television also stops the 
chronological clock by miming its regularity and predictability around the clock, running 
and rerunning the familiar foreignness of traumatic repetition. Indeed, one would be 
hard-pressed to prove that the effectivity of TV is not a symptom of the traumatic stress 
which it also works to perpetuate. In their article on trauma, entitled "The Intrusive 
Past," Bessel A. van der Kolk and Onno van der Hart describe trauma as if it were linked 
to the very functioning of the television apparatus, or, at least, as if the traumatized 
subject were caught in a perpetual state of internalized channel surfing: "He switches 
from one [existence} to the other without synchronization because he is reporting not on 
a sequence but a simultaneity. . . . A different state consists of a continuous switching 
from one internal world to another."12 A monument to that which cannot be stabilized, 
television captures the disruption, seriation, effraction of cognition, and internal breaks - 
whether commercial or constitutive - and is scripted by the need to play out the differ- 
ence between reference and phenomenality. On this score, there remains one more thing 
to be said about the relation of television to trauma. This has everything to do with the 
essential character of traumatism as a nonsymbolizable wound that comes before any 
other effraction: this would be TV's guide - how to symbolize the wound that will not 
be shown. 
Of the symptoms that television most indelibly remarks, one is the alternation marked 
between hypermnesia and amnesia. What is the relation between amnesia and the image? 
We have observed in films such as Total Recall that, in order to discover the limits of any 
positable reality, acts of remembering are prompted by mnemonic devices along the lines 
of video implants. In fact, video has tracked considerable thematizations of internalized, 
commemorative memory (Erinnerzlng in Hegel's vocabulary) that are nothing if not the 
literalization of Gedachtnis, an external memory prompter, a cue, or memo-padding. While 
these video implants are often accompanied by nightmarish hues, they somehow remain 
external to the subject who needs these prompters to supplement an absence of memory. 
The image comes to infuse an amnesiac subject. "Total recall" is not the same as memory 
or recollection, and it is only total to the extent that it names the need for a prosthetic 
technology that would produce a memory track. In such films the video transport - these 
are always pointing to a modality of transport; constantly neurotransmitting highs, crashes, 
incessant repetition or fuzzing, they combine the idioms of drugs and electronics - induces 
some sort of trip, a condition of memory seen as lapsus, stimulating the transmission of 
the slip. The video transport coexists with a condition of stated amnesia. I t  is upon this 
amnesia, channel surfing through blank zones of trauma, that television, operating on 
screen memories and forgetting, secretly measures the force of an unbearable history. 
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